This paper introduces the novel concept of proactive resource allocation
through which the predictability of user behavior is exploited to balance the
wireless traffic over time, and hence, significantly reduce the bandwidth
required to achieve a given blocking/outage probability. We start with a simple
model in which the smart wireless devices are assumed to predict the arrival of
new requests and submit them to the network T time slots in advance.
In this paper, we present two practical ARQ-Based security schemes for Wi-Fi
and RFID networks. Our proposed schemes enhance the confidentiality and
authenticity functions of these networks, respectively. Both schemes build on
the same idea; by exploiting the statistical independence between the multipath
fading experienced by the legitimate nodes and potential adversaries, secret
keys are established and then are continuously updated.
This work considers the two way wiretap channel in which two legitimate
users, Alice and Bob, wish to exchange messages securely in the presence of a
passive eavesdropper Eve. In the full duplex scenario, where each node can
transmit and receive simultaneously, we obtain new achievable secrecy rate
regions based on the idea of allowing the two users to jointly optimize their
channel prefixing distributions and binning codebooks; in addition to key
sharing. The new regions are shown to be strictly larger than the known ones
for a wide class of discrete memoryless and Gaussian channels.
This paper develops a novel framework for sharing secret keys using the
Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) protocol. We first characterize the underlying
information theoretic limits, under different assumptions on the channel
spatial and temporal correlation function. Our analysis reveals a novel role of
"dumb antennas" in overcoming the negative impact of spatial correlation on the
achievable secrecy rates.
This work studies the achievable secure rate per source-destination pair in
wireless networks. First, a path loss model is considered, where the legitimate
and eavesdropper nodes are assumed to be placed according to Poisson point
processes with intensities $\lambda$ and $\lambda_e$, respectively. It is shown
that, as long as $\lambda_e/\lambda=o((\log n)^{-2})$, almost all of the nodes
achieve a perfectly secure rate of $\Omega(\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}})$ for the
extended and dense network models.
Wyner's work on wiretap channels and the recent works on information
theoretic security are based on random codes. Achieving information theoretical
security with practical coding schemes is of definite interest. In this note,
the attempt is to overcome this elusive task by employing the polar coding
technique of Ar{\i}kan. It is shown that polar codes achieve non-trivial
perfect secrecy rates for binary-input degraded wiretap channels while enjoying
their low encoding-decoding complexity.
We consider in this paper the design of full diversity and high rate
space-time codes with moderate decoding complexity for arbitrary number of
transmit and receive antennas and arbitrary input alphabets. We focus our
attention to codes from the threaded algebraic space-time (TAST) framework
since the latter includes most known full diversity space-time codes. We
propose a new construction of the component single-input single-output (SISO)
encoders such that the equivalent code matrix has an upper triangular form.
This paper develops a new physical layer framework for secure two-way
wireless communication in the presence of a passive eavesdropper, i.e., Eve.
Our approach achieves perfect information theoretic secrecy via a novel
randomized scheduling and power allocation scheme. The key idea is to allow
Alice and Bob to send symbols at random time instants. While Alice will be able
to determine the symbols transmitted by Bob, Eve will suffer from ambiguity
regarding the source of any particular symbol. This desirable ambiguity is
enhanced, in our approach, by randomizing the transmit power level.
Inspired by our earlier work on Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) secrecy, we
propose a simple, yet efficient, security overlay protocol to existing 802.11
networks. Our work targets networks secured by the Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP) protocol because of its widespread use and vulnerability to a multitude
of security threats. By exploiting the existing ARQ protocol in the 802.11
standard, our proposed opportunistic secrecy scheme is shown to defend against
all known passive WEP attacks.