In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the
celebrated problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible
auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can
have arbitrary demand and budget constraints. Our mechanisms are surprisingly
simple: We show that a sequential all-pay mechanism is a 4 approximation to the
revenue of the optimal ex-interim truthful mechanism with discrete correlated
type space for each bidder.
We theoretically analyze the Cops and Robber Game for the first time in a
multidimensional grid. It is shown that for an $n$-dimensional grid, at least
$n$ cops are necessary to ensure capture of the robber. We also present a set
of cop strategies for which $n$ cops are provably sufficient to catch the
robber. Further, for two-dimensional grid, we provide an efficient cop strategy
for which the robber is caught even by a single cop under certain conditions.