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Michal Feldman

  1. Solving Cooperative Reliability Games.

    Mon, 02/20/2012 - 15:01 — SomNambul
    Authors: Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz, Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir
    Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory
    Abstract

    Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions,
    following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the
    reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in
    the game. In the reliability extension, each agent only "survives" with a
    certain probability, and a coalition's value is the probability that its
    surviving members would be a winning coalition in the base game. We study
    prominent solution concepts in such games, showing how to approximate the
    Shapley value and how to compute the core in games with few agent types.

  2. Signaling Schemes for Revenue Maximization.

    Thu, 02/09/2012 - 15:01 — SomNambul
    Authors: Michal Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz, Yuval Emek, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme
    Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory
    Abstract

    Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in
    economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to
    a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce
    the study of signaling when conducting a second price auction of a
    probabilistic good whose actual instantiation is known to the auctioneer but
    not to the bidders. This framework can be used to model impressions selling in
    display advertising. We study the problem of computing a signaling scheme that
    maximizes the auctioneer's revenue in a Bayesian setting.

  3. On the Interplay between Incentive Compatibility and Envy Freeness.

    Tue, 03/30/2010 - 15:02 — SomNambul
    Authors: Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky
    Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory
    Abstract

    We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents
    have no incentive to lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for
    which no agent will seek to exchange outcomes with another (envy-free).
    Mechanisms satisfying each requirement separately have been studied
    extensively, but there are few results on mechanisms achieving both.

  4. Truth and Envy in Capacitated Allocation Games.

    Tue, 03/30/2010 - 15:02 — SomNambul
    Authors: Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky
    Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory
    Abstract

    We study auctions with additive valuations where agents have a limit on the
    number of items they may receive. We refer to this setting as {\em capacitated
    allocation games.} We seek truthful and envy free mechanisms that maximize the
    social welfare. {\sl I.e.}, where agents have no incentive to lie and no agent
    seeks to exchange outcomes with another. In 1983, Leonard showed that VCG with
    Clarke Pivot payments (which is known to be truthful, individually rational,
    and have no positive transfers), is also an envy free mechanism for the special
    case of $n$ items and $n$ unit capacity agents.

  5. Envy-Free Makespan Approximation.

    Tue, 09/08/2009 - 12:16 — SomNambul
    Authors: Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky
    Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory
    Abstract

    We study envy-free mechanisms for scheduling tasks on unrelated machines
    (agents) that approximately minimize the makespan. For indivisible tasks, we
    put forward an envy-free poly-time mechanism that approximates the minimal
    makespan to within a factor of $O(\log m)$, where $m$ is the number of
    machines. We also show a lower bound of $\Omega(\log m / \log\log m)$. This
    improves the recent result of Hartline {\sl et al.} \cite{Ahuva:2008} who give
    an upper bound of $(m+1)/2$, and a lower bound of $2-1/m$.

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