Transmitters of a multiple access channel are assumed to freely choose their
power control strategy in order to be energy-efficient. We show that in a
stochastic game framework, we can develop energy-efficient distributed control
strategies which only require partial knowledge of the entire system.
Achievable utility equilibrium region is characterized and based on
time-sharing, an explicit power control strategy is proposed.
We analyze the problem of distributed power allocation for orthogonal
multiple access channels by considering a non-cooperative game whose strategy
space corresponds to the users' distribution of transmission power over the
network's channels. When the channels are static, we find that this game admits
an exact potential function and this allows us to show that it has a unique
equilibrium almost surely.
This paper is concerned with the concept of equilibrium and quality of
service (QoS) provisioning in self-configuring wireless networks with
non-cooperative radio devices (RD). In contrast with the Nash equilibrium (NE),
where RDs are interested in selfishly maximizing its QoS, we present a concept
of equilibrium, named satisfaction equilibrium (SE), where RDs are interested
only in guaranteing a minimum QoS. We provide the conditions for the existence
and the uniqueness of the SE.
Decentralized multiple access channels where each transmitter wants to
selfishly maximize his transmission energy-efficiency are considered.
Transmitters are assumed to choose freely their power control policy and
interact (through multiuser interference) several times. It is shown that the
corresponding conflict of interest can have a predictable outcome, namely a
finitely or discounted repeated game equilibrium.