Francesca RossI
Stable marriage problems with quantitative preferences.
Fri, 07/30/2010 - 15:02 — SomNambulAuthors: Toby Walsh, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca RossI, Brent Venable
Subjects: Artificial Intelligence
AbstractThe stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women
so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each
other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging
from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools or
more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical stable marriage
problem, both men and women express a strict preference order over the members
of the other sex, in a qualitative way.Local search for stable marriage problems with ties and incomplete lists.
Tue, 07/06/2010 - 15:03 — SomNambulAuthors: Toby Walsh, Mirco Gelain, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca RossI, Kristen Brent Venable
Subjects: General Literature
AbstractThe stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications,
ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to
schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful
variation of the stable marriage problem, where the men and women express their
preferences using a preference list with ties over a subset of the members of
the other sex. Matchings are permitted only with people who appear in these
preference lists. In this setting, we study the problem of finding a stable
matching that marries as many people as possible.
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