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Arpita Ghosh

  1. Competitive Equilibria in Matching Markets with Budgets.

    Пт, 04/16/2010 - 15:01 — SomNambul
    Authors: Ning Chen, Arpita Ghosh, Xiaotie Deng
    Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory
    Abstract

    We study competitive equilibria in the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment
    model with indivisible goods and unit-demand buyers, with budget constraints:
    buyers can specify a maximum price they are willing to pay for each item,
    beyond which they cannot afford the item. This single discontinuity introduced
    by the budget constraint fundamentally changes the properties of equilibria: in
    the assignment model without budget constraints, a competitive equilibrium
    always exists, and corresponds exactly to a stable matching. With budgets, a
    competitive equilibrium need not always exist.

  2. Truthful Assignment without Money.

    Втр, 01/05/2010 - 16:02 — SomNambul
    Authors: Arpita Ghosh, Shaddin Dughmi
    Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory
    Abstract

    We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the
    generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP
    consists of a bipartite graph with jobs on one side and machines on the other.
    Machines have capacities and edges have values and sizes; the goal is to
    construct a welfare maximizing feasible assignment. In our model of private
    valuations, motivated by impossibility results, the value and sizes on all
    job-machine pairs are public information; however, whether an edge exists or
    not in the bipartite graph is a job's private information.

  3. Bidding for Representative Allocations for Display Advertising.

    Ср, 10/07/2009 - 12:26 — SomNambul
    Authors: Sergei Vassilvitskii, Arpita Ghosh, Preston McAfee, Kishore Papineni
    Subjects: Multiagent Systems
    Abstract

    Display advertising has traditionally been sold via guaranteed contracts -- a
    guaranteed contract is a deal between a publisher and an advertiser to allocate
    a certain number of impressions over a certain period, for a pre-specified
    price per impression. However, as spot markets for display ads, such as the
    RightMedia Exchange, have grown in prominence, the selection of advertisements
    to show on a given page is increasingly being chosen based on price, using an
    auction. As the number of participants in the exchange grows, the price of an
    impressions becomes a signal of its value.

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