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Mohamed Ali Kaafar

  1. Compromising Tor Anonymity Exploiting P2P Information Leakage.

    Пнд, 04/12/2010 - 15:01 — SomNambul
    Authors: Claude Castelluccia, Arnaud Legout, Walid Dabbous, Stevens Le Blond, Mohamed Ali Kaafar, Pere Manils, Chaabane Abdelberri
    Subjects: Networking and Internet Architecture
    Abstract

    Privacy of users in P2P networks goes far beyond their current usage and is a
    fundamental requirement to the adoption of P2P protocols for legal usage. In a
    climate of cold war between these users and anti-piracy groups, more and more
    users are moving to anonymizing networks in an attempt to hide their identity.
    However, when not designed to protect users information, a P2P protocol would
    leak information that may compromise the identity of its users. In this paper,
    we first present three attacks targeting BitTorrent users on top of Tor that
    reveal their real IP addresses.

  2. De-anonymizing BitTorrent Users on Tor.

    Пт, 04/09/2010 - 15:01 — SomNambul
    Authors: Arnaud Legout, Walid Dabbous, Stevens Le Blond, Mohamed Ali Kaafar, Pere Manils, Abdelberi Chaabane, Claude Castellucia
    Subjects: Networking and Internet Architecture
    Abstract

    Some BitTorrent users are running BitTorrent on top of Tor to preserve their
    privacy. In this extended abstract, we discuss three different attacks to
    reveal the IP address of BitTorrent users on top of Tor. In addition, we
    exploit the multiplexing of streams from different applications into the same
    circuit to link non-BitTorrent applications to revealed IP addresses.

  3. Spying the World from your Laptop -- Identifying and Profiling Content Providers and Big Downloaders in BitTorrent.

    Ср, 04/07/2010 - 15:02 — SomNambul
    Authors: Arnaud Legout, Walid Dabbous, Stevens Le Blond, Fabrice Le Fessant, Mohamed Ali Kaafar
    Subjects: Networking and Internet Architecture
    Abstract

    This paper presents a set of exploits an adversary can use to continuously
    spy on most BitTorrent users of the Internet from a single machine and for a
    long period of time. Using these exploits for a period of 103 days, we
    collected 148 million IPs downloading 2 billion copies of contents. We identify
    the IP address of the content providers for 70% of the BitTorrent contents we
    spied on. We show that a few content providers inject most contents into
    BitTorrent and that those content providers are located in foreign data
    centers.

Math-arch

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