It is well known that opportunistic scheduling algorithms are throughput
optimal under full knowledge of channel and network conditions. However, these
algorithms achieve a hypothetical achievable rate region which does not take
into account the overhead associated with channel probing and feedback required
to obtain the full channel state information at every slot. We adopt a channel
probing model where $\beta$ fraction of time slot is consumed for acquiring the
channel state information (CSI) of a single channel.
In many real world problems, optimization decisions have to be made with
limited information. The decision maker may have no a priori or posteriori data
about the often nonconvex objective function except from on a limited number of
points that are obtained over time through costly observations. This paper
presents an optimization framework that takes into account the information
collection (observation), estimation (regression), and optimization
(maximization) aspects in a holistic and structured manner.
In many real world problems, control decisions have to be made with limited
information. The controller may have no a priori (or even posteriori) data on
the nonlinear system, except from a limited number of points that are obtained
over time. This is either due to high cost of observation or the highly
non-stationary nature of the system.
Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design
strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the
participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game
outcome is optimal with respect to a global criterion (e.g. maximizing a social
welfare function), preference-compatible, and strategy-proof, i.e. players have
no reason to deceive the designer. The mechanism designer achieves these
objectives by introducing specific rules and incentives to the players; in this
case by adding resource prices to their utilities.
We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of
nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of
the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have
access to each other's payoff matrix. Each has to observe the other's actions
up to present and plays the action generated based on the best response to
these observations.
We consider the problem of rate allocation among multiple simultaneous video
streams sharing multiple heterogeneous access networks. We develop and evaluate
an analytical framework for optimal rate allocation based on observed available
bit rate (ABR) and round-trip time (RTT) over each access network and video
distortion-rate (DR) characteristics. The rate allocation is formulated as a
convex optimization problem that minimizes the total expected distortion of all
video streams.
We study and develop a robust control framework for malware filtering and
network security. We investigate the malware filtering problem by capturing the
tradeoff between increased security on one hand and continued usability of the
network on the other. We analyze the problem using a linear control system
model with a quadratic cost structure and develop algorithms based on H
infinity-optimal control theory. A dynamic feedback filter is derived and shown
via numerical analysis to be an improvement over various heuristic approaches
to malware filtering.