In this paper we study the generalized version of weighted matching in
bipartite networks. Consider a weighted matching in a bipartite network in
which the nodes derive value from the split of the matching edge assigned to
them if they are matched. The value a node derives from the split depends both
on the split as well as the partner the node is matched to. We assume that the
value of a split to the node is continuous and strictly increasing in the part
of the split assigned to the node.
In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network
exclusively choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then
there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable. Pair-wise stability
implies that no individual breaks her partnership and no two neighbors in the
network can form a new partnership while breaking other partnerships if any so
that at least one of them improves her payoff and the other one does at least
as good.