In this paper we establish links between, and new results for, three problems
that are not usually considered together. The first is a matrix decomposition
problem that arises in areas such as statistical modeling and signal
processing: given a matrix $X$ formed as the sum of an unknown diagonal matrix
and an unknown low rank positive semidefinite matrix, decompose $X$ into these
constituents. The second problem we consider is to determine the facial
structure of the set of correlation matrices, a convex set also known as the
elliptope.
Except for special classes of games, there is no systematic framework for
analyzing the dynamical properties of multi-agent strategic interactions.
Potential games are one such special but restrictive class of games that allow
for tractable dynamic analysis. Intuitively, games that are "close" to a
potential game should share similar properties. In this paper, we formalize and
develop this idea by quantifying to what extent the dynamic features of
potential games extend to "near-potential" games.
In applications throughout science and engineering one is often faced with
the challenge of solving an ill-posed inverse problem, where the number of
available measurements is smaller than the dimension of the model to be
estimated. However in many practical situations of interest, models are
constrained structurally so that they only have a few degrees of freedom
relative to their ambient dimension. This paper provides a general framework to
convert notions of simplicity into convex penalty functions, resulting in
convex optimization solutions to linear, underdetermined inverse problems.
The structural properties of graphs are usually characterized in terms of
invariants, which are functions of graphs that do not depend on the labeling of
the nodes. In this paper we study convex graph invariants, which are graph
invariants that are convex functions of the adjacency matrix of a graph. Some
examples include functions of a graph such as the maximum degree, the MAXCUT
value (and its semidefinite relaxation), and spectral invariants such as the
sum of the $k$ largest eigenvalues.
Suppose we have samples of a \emph{subset} of a collection of random
variables. No additional information is provided about the number of latent
variables, nor of the relationship between the latent and observed variables.
Is it possible to discover the number of hidden components, and to learn a
statistical model over the entire collection of variables? We address this
question in the setting in which the latent and observed variables are jointly
Gaussian, with the conditional statistics of the observed variables conditioned
on the latent variables being specified by a graphical model.
We give a novel proof of the existence of Nash equilibria in all finite games
without using fixed point theorems or path following arguments. Our approach
relies on a new notion intermediate between Nash and correlated equilibria
called exchangeable equilibria, which are correlated equilibria with certain
symmetry and factorization properties. We prove these exist by a duality
argument, using Hart and Schmeidler's proof of correlated equilibrium existence
as a first step.
In this paper we introduce a novel flow representation for finite games in
strategic form. This representation allows us to develop a canonical direct sum
decomposition of an arbitrary game into three components, which we refer to as
the potential, harmonic and nonstrategic components. We analyze natural classes
of games that are induced by this decomposition, and in particular, focus on
games with no harmonic component and games with no potential component. We show
that the first class corresponds to the well-known potential games.
The purpose of this note is to survey a methodology to solve systems of
polynomial equations and inequalities. The techniques we discuss use the
algebra of multivariate polynomials with coefficients over a field to create
large-scale linear algebra or semidefinite programming relaxations of many
kinds of feasibility or optimization questions. We are particularly interested
in problems arising in combinatorial optimization.