We study combinatorial auctions for the secondary spectrum market. In this
market, short-term licenses shall be given to wireless nodes for communication
in their local neighborhood. In contrast to the primary market, channels can be
assigned to multiple bidders, provided that the corresponding devices are well
separated such that the interference is sufficiently low.
We consider network contribution games, where each agent in a social network
has a budget of effort that he can contribute to different collaborative
projects. Depending on the contribution of the involved agents a project will
flourish or drown, and to measure the success we use a reward function for each
project. Every agent is trying to maximize the reward from all projects that it
is involved in. We consider pairwise equilibria of this game, and characterize
the existence, computational complexity, and quality of equilibrium based on
the types of reward functions involved.
In this paper we consider strategic cost sharing games with so-called
arbitrary sharing based on various combinatorial optimization problems, such as
vertex and set cover, facility location, and network design problems. We
concentrate on the existence and computational complexity of strong equilibria,
in which no coalition can improve the cost of each of its members.