Intentional interference constitutes a major threat for communication
networks operating over a shared medium and where availability is imperative.
Jamming attacks are often simple and cheap to implement. In particular, today's
jammers can perform physical carrier sensing in order to disrupt communication
more efficiently, specially in a network of simple wireless devices such as
sensor nodes, which usually operate over a single frequency (or a limited
frequency band) and which cannot benefit from the use of spread spectrum or
other more advanced technologies. This paper proposes the medium access (MAC)
protocol \textsc{AntiJam} that is provably robust against a powerful reactive
adversary who can jam a $(1-\epsilon)$-portion of the time steps, where
$\epsilon$ is an arbitrary constant. The adversary uses carrier sensing to make
informed decisions on when it is most harmful to disrupt communications;
moreover, we allow the adversary to be adaptive and to have complete knowledge
of the entire protocol history. Our MAC protocol is able to make efficient use
of the non-jammed time periods and achieves an asymptotically optimal,
$\Theta{(1)}$-competitive throughput in this harsh scenario. In addition,
\textsc{AntiJam} features a low convergence time and has good fairness
properties. Our simulation results validate our theoretical results and also
show that our algorithm manages to guarantee constant througput where the
802.11 MAC protocol basically fails to deliver any packets.